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Gay and lesbian sexuality has very recently been encompassed
within the international human rights framework established by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (UDHR) and the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' (ICCPR). In
1994, in Toonen v. Australia,' the United Nations Human Rights
Committee firmly established the protection of gay men and lesbi-
ans from arbitrary interference with privacy. Additionally, the
Committee recognized that the ICCPR offers protection from dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual preference. However, interna-
tional human rights law is effective only when it translates into real
change for people in various countries bound by the international
human rights regime. In many countries, international human
rights law may be used as an aid to or as the basis for domestic
litigation to achieve local change. In this paper, I explore the po-
tential use of international human rights law in domestic litigation
around issues of sexuality, particularly non-normative sexualities. I
will use as a case study the Toonen case, which concerned the battle
to overturn the anti-sodomy laws in Tasmania, an Australian state.
t L.L.B (Hons); B.S.c.; L.L.M. (Melb); L.L.M. (Columbia University); Senior Lec-
turer in Law, University of Melbourne; Adjunct Professor and J.S.D. Candidate, Co-
lumbia University Law School. I would like to thank the Fulbright Commission,
without whom my doctoral work on issues of law and sexuality would not have been
possible. I would also like to thank Wayne Morgan for his comments on an earlier
draft of this paper and his tireless work on the Toonen case. A shorter version of this
paper was presented at Bringing It Home: Building International Human Rights Law, Ad-
vocacy and Culture, A Conference to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, held at the City University of New York School of Law, 1 May-3 May
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1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and First Optional Proto-
col, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st. Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [here-
inafter ICCPR].
3 Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) [hereinafter Toonen]. This decision will be dis-
cussed further in Part III, below.
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Although the focus of this article is Australian, I hope to offer some
insights of more general relevance to the litigation of applicability
of sexuality issues.
In Part II, I briefly set out some of the relevant Australian legal
principles that influenced the way in which the Toonen case was
approached at both the international and domestic levels. In Part
III, I describe the unsuccessful lobbying campaign to repeal Tasma-
nia's anti-sodomy laws and address the subsequent strategy: taking
a case to the Human Rights Committee. Part IV addresses the do-
mestic phase: lobbying for legislative change and ultimately litigat-
ing in the Australian courts. In Part V, I consider the lessons for
litigating sexuality issues that can be drawn from the Toonen case.
II. SOME KEY AUSTRALIAN LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Australia's Constitutional Protection of Rights
Australia does not have a general, constitutional Bill of Rights.
In this sense, our British heritage is clearly evident - the founders
of the Constitution considered that responsible government, which
requires members of the executive to be members of Parliament,4
was sufficient to protect individual rights, making a full Bill of
Rights unnecessary.5 However, some rights are expressly protected
by our Constitution: for example, a limited freedom of religion;6 a
freedom of interstate trade;7 a right to a trial by jury for indictable
offences;8 a right not to be subject to discrimination on the basis of
the state in which one resides;9 and a limited right to vote.1"
In addition to the few rights that are expressly provided for in
the Australian Constitution, the High Court of Australia has found
an implied restriction on the Commonwealth Parliament's power
4 See AUSTL. CONST. ch. II, § 64.
5 See OFFIcIAL RECORD OF THE DEBATES OF THE AUSTRALASIAN FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION, 1897-1898, Melbourne, 664-91; see also Peter H. Bailey, HUMAN RIGHTS: AUSTRA-
LIA IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 50-51 (1990);J.A. La Nauze, THE MAKING OF THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 227-32 (1972).
6 AUSTL. CONST. ch. V, § 116 (this section has been restrictively interpreted); see
Attorney-General for the State of Victoria ex rel Black v. Commonwealth (1981) 146
C.L.R. 559; Church of Scientology, Inc. v. Woodward (1982) 154 C.L.R. 25.
7 AUSTL. CONST. ch. IV, § 92; see Cole v. Whitfield (1988) 165 C.L.R. 360.
8 AUSTL. CONST. ch. III, § 80; see Cheatle v. The Queen (1993) 177 C.L.R. 541.
9 AUSTL. CONST. ch. V, § 117; see Street v. Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168
C.L.R. 461.
10 AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. II, § 7; pt. III, § 24. But see McGinty v. Western Australia
(1996) 134 A.L.R. 289; Langer v. Commonwealth (1996) 134 A.L.R. 400.
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to limit political communication.'1 This restriction is loosely
known as the implied right to freedom of political speech, which
has been extended to limit the power of the State Parliaments and
to modify the common law.' 2 Notably, this right is confined to citi-
zens; it does not protect the political communication of non-
citizens."
Australia's federal structure places limitations on the Com-
monwealth Parliament's law-making powers. 4 The Parliament has
no specific power to protect rights generally. However, the Parlia-
ment has used a combination of powers, such as the corporation's
power 5 and, more importantly, the external affairs power to pro-
tect rights. 16 If the Commonwealth Parliament enacts human
rights legislation, or any other kind of legislation, then that legisla-
tion overrides any inconsistent State legislation by virtue of Section
109 of the Constitution, which makes federal laws paramount."
The combination of the absence of rights protection and the
Commonwealth Parliament's limited legislative competence has
led to a significant role for international law in the protection of
human rights in Australia.
B. The Relationship Between International Law and Australian Law
Australia is a party to the main human rights treaties, includ-
ing the ICCPR.' 8 However, this does not necessarily ensure legal
protection for individuals within Australia. The basic rule gov-
erning the relationship between international treaties and domes-
tic law in Australia is that international conventions are not part of
domestic law-that is, they are not enforceable in domestic courts.
I See Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R.
106; Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1.
12 See Theophanous v. Herald and Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 104; Ste-
phens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (1994) 182 C.L.R. 211.
13 See Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (1994) 182 C.L.R. 272.
14 See AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, §§ 51- 52 (enumerating the powers of the federal
Parliament).
15 See id. ch. 1, pt. V, § 51 (xx).
16 See id. ch. I, pt. V, § 51 (xxix); see infra Part III.
17 See id. ch. V, § 109.
18 Other treaties to which Australia is a party include the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, entered into force Jan. 3,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, adopted Dec. 21, 1965, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660
U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, entered into force, Sept. 20,
1990.
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This premise has been established in a series of cases. 9
However, the Commonwealth Parliament is able to legislate to
give effect to treaties using the external affairs power.2" This was
recently reaffirmed by the High Court in Victoria v. Commonwealth,2'
where the Court stated:
To be a law with respect to "external affairs" the law must
be reasonably capable of being considered appropriate and
adapted to implementing the treaty; it is for the Executive to
choose the means by which it carries into or gives effect to a
treaty provided that the means chosen are reasonably capable of
being considered appropriate and adapted to that end.
The [external affairs] power was designed to authorise the im-
plementation of treaty obligations which bound Australia. 2
This interpretation of the external affairs power has been con-
troversial in Australian legal and political arenas due to its effect on
the federal balance between the States and the Commonwealth,23
but it is well established. Indeed, an argument was presented to
the Court in Victoria v. Commonwealth that the power ought to be
confined so as to reduce the potential for the Commonwealth to
trespass upon areas previously within the sole province of the
States.24 However, that argument was rejected:
According to basic constitutional principle, and with qualifica-
tions not presently relevant, the intrusion of Commonwealth law
into a field that has hitherto been the preserve of State law is not
a reason to deny validity to the Commonwealth law provided it
19 See Brown v. Lizars (1905) 2 C.L.R. 837, 851; Chow Hung Ching v. The King
(1948) 77 C.L.R. 449, 478; Bradley v. Commonwealth (1973) 128 C.L.R. 557, 582;
Tasmanian Wilderness Society, Inc. v. Fraser (1982) 153 C.L.R. 270; Kioa v. West
(1985) 159 C.L.R. 550, 570; Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 55, 79;
Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 305, 359-60; Minister for Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 128 A.L.R. 353, 362, 370, 384.
20 See Tasmania v. Commonwealth (The Tasmanian Dam Case) (1985) 158 C.L.R.
1; Kirmani v. Captain Cook Cruises Proprietary Ltd. (1985) 159 C.L.R. 351; Gerhardy
v. Brown (1985) 159 C.L.R. 70; Richardson v. Forestry Comm'n (1988) 164 C.L.R.
261; Queensland v. Commonwealth (The Queensland Rainforest Case) (1989) 167
C.L.R. 232. For a more comprehensive analysis of the external affairs power and the
role of treaties, see Leslie Zines, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION, Ch. 13 (3d
ed. 1992); Donald R. Rothwell, The High Court and the External Affairs Power: A Consider-
ation of its Outer and Inner Limits, 15 ADEL. L. REV. 209 (1993); Brian R. Opeskin and
Donald R. Rothwell, The Impact of Treaties on Australian Federalism, 27 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1995).
21 (1996) 138 A.L.R. 129.
22 Id. at 130, 144.
23 See Sir Garfield Barwick, The External Affairs Power of the Commonwealth and the
Protection of World Heritage, 25 U. WEST. AUSTL. L. REv. 233 (1995).
24 Victoria v. Commonwealth, 138 A.L.R. at 144.
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is, in truth, a law with respect to external affairs.2 5
C. The Use of the External Affairs Power for the Protection of Human
Rights
The Commonwealth's ability to use the external affairs power
to implement treaties has been significant in the federal protection
of human rights in Australia. Many important pieces of legislation
have been enacted in reliance upon the existence of a human
rights treaty where the Commonwealth would not otherwise have
the constitutional power to enact such legislation. Some notable
examples include the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 (Cth.) 2 6
(relying on the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination), the Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 (Cth.)2 7
(relying on the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women), the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Com-
mission Act of 1986 (Cth.) 21 (relying on a series of Conventions,
including the ICCPR) and the Disability Discrimination Act of
1992 (Cth.). 29  However, the law can do only part of the work to
effect social change: limitations on the effectiveness of these legis-
lative regimes still exist. For example, decisions of the Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission under the Racial Dis-
crimination Act and the Sex Discrimination Act have been held to
be unenforceable because of the separation of powers principle en-
shrined in the Constitution."' This not only reduces the effective-
ness of the main human rights watchdog in Australia, it also
reduces access to remedies for human rights violations by requir-
ing individuals to use the courts, which often involves significant
costs and lengthy delays.
Recently, the Sexuality Discrimination Bill of 1995 (Cth.) 3' was
introduced into the Parliament, again in reliance on the external
affairs power and the ICCPR.3 2 This Bill has not yet been passed
25 Id. at 145.
26 See Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Austl.).
27 See Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Austl.).
28 See Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Comm'n Act 1986 (Austl.).
29 See Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Austl.).
30 The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission is not a court; as such it
is not permitted to exercise judicial power, including the power to give binding deci-
sions tinder the Racial Discrimination Act and Sex Discrimination Act. See Brandy v.
Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Comm'n (1995) 127 A.L.R. 1, 2.
31 See Sexuality Discrimination Bill 1995 (Austl.).
32 The Bill was introduced in the Senate by the Democrats, a minor party. While
the Senate passed the Bill in May 1998, it is unlikely that it will pass through the
House of Representatives, which is presently dominated by the Liberal and National
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into law and it is not likely to be because of the conservative domi-
nance of the Lower House.
III. CASE STUDY: CRIMINALIZATION OF GAY MALE SEX IN TASMANIA
A. Background
Most states in Australia decriminalized gay male sex (lesbian
sex was never expressly criminalized in Australia) in the 1970s,
1980s and early 1990s."3 However, Tasmania steadfastly refused to
do so. The Tasmanian Criminal Code relevantly provided:
§ 122: - Any person who -
(a) has sexual intercourse with any person against the order of
nature;
• . . or ....
(c) consents to a male person having sexual intercourse with
him or her against the order of nature, is guilty of a crime.
Charge: Unnatural sexual intercourse.
§ 123:
Any male person who, whether in public or private, commits any
indecent assault upon, or other act of gross indecency with, an-
other male person, or procures another male person to commit
any act of gross indecency with himself or any other male per-
son, is guilty of a crime.
Charge: Indecent practice between male persons.34
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Tasmania witnessed a period of
sustained activism by gay men and lesbians to have the legislation
repealed. However, extensive lobbying and protests were futile.
Although the government supported legislative reform on two oc-
casions, the gerrymandered upper house continually blocked such
efforts. No court case was possible, however, because no constitu-
tional provision existed (such as a right to privacy or equality) that
could be used as a basis to challenge a properly enacted law. Fur-
thermore, there was no relevant federal legislation which could be
used to override the Tasmanian legislation. 35 The only route was
Parties, parties known for their opposition to pro-gay law reform. For a more detailed
discussion of the Sexuality Discrimination Bill, see Wayne Morgan, A Queer Kind of
Law: The Senate Inquires into Sexuality, 2 INT'LJ. DISCRIMINATION & LAw 317 (1997).
33 See Tasmanian Gay and Lesbian Rights Group, It's Over: Nine Year Gay Law Reform
Campaign Ends in Victoy, <http://www.tased.edu.au/tasonline/tasqueer/flash.html>
(May 1, 1997).
34 TAS. CRIM. CODE §§ 122-123.
35 Australia has no federal anti-discrimination law covering discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation; nor does Australia have a comprehensive regime protect-
ing the right to privacy. There is some protection of privacy, but it is limited to the
area of data collection. See Privacy Act of 1988 (Cth.) (Austl.).
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legislative change, but this proved impossible to achieve.
B. The Toonen Case at the United Nations Human Rights Committee
The opportunity for new a strategy came in December 1991,
when Australia ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR,3 6
which permitted individuals to make complaints to the United Na-
tions Human Rights Committee regarding human rights breaches
by Australia. Nicholas Toonen, a gay man living in Tasmania,
lodged the first communication from Australia the day the ratifica-
tion of the First Optional Protocol took effect." Mr. Toonen was
supported by the Tasmanian Gay and Lesbian Rights Group
(TGLRG).8 The complaint alleged breaches of the ICCPR with
respect to the rights to privacy and equality." -
THE ADMISSIBILITY PHASE
The first stage of the Toonen case before the United Nations
Human Rights Committee concerned admissibility. The issues in-
volved standing and exhaustion of local remedies, which requires
individuals to explore all avenues in their domestic legal system
before making a complaint to the Committee. The United Nations
Human Rights Committee is required to satisfy itself of a complain-
ant's standing before proceeding with the case.4" Standing was in
issue because Mr. Toonen had not been arrested, charged, or pros-
ecuted under the laws in question. Indeed, for almost ten years
there had been no prosecution under the Tasmanian legislation of
consensual gay male sex in private.41 Mr. Toonen and the TGLRG
argued that the laws resulted in discrimination, stigmatization and
violence against gay men and lesbians and gave extensive examples
from Mr. Toonen's own life.4 2 The Human Rights Committee ac-
cepted Mr. Toonen's arguments on the standing issue.
36 See Wayne Morgan, Sexuality, and International Human Rights: The First Communica-
tion By an Australian to the Human Rights Committee Under The Optimal Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 14 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 277 (1993).
37 See Toonen, supra note 3, 1.
38 See Toonen, supra note 3, 1.
19 See Toonen, supra note 3, 77 2.3, 2.4.
40 See Toonen, supra note 3, 1 8.1, 8.3. The committee found that Mr. Toonen
had made reasonable efforts to demonstrate that the threat of enforcement had af-
fected and continued to affect him.
41 Sections 122 and 123 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code have been used to prose-
cute "public" consensual sexual activity between men and sexual activity with minors,
but this was not relevant to the case. The state party conceded that the laws in ques-
tion have not been prosecuted since 1984. Toonen, supra note 3, 1 8.2.
42 See Toonen, supra note 3, 2.5.
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THE MERITS PHASE
Mr. Toonen's complaint alleged a breach of two provisions of
the ICCPR: Article 17, which protects privacy, and Article 26, which
provides for equality.4 3 Privacy was the main argument on which
the Committee focused, though equality was also briefly addressed.
Article 17 of the ICCPR provides:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interfer-
ence with his privacy, family, home or correspondence...
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.44
Mr. Toonen claimed that the mere existence of the laws criminaliz-
ing gay male sex amounted to an arbitrary interference with his
privacy, notwithstanding that they had not been used against pri-
vate, consensual sexual activity for some time."5 Tasmania, on the
other hand, argued that even if they interfered with Toonen's pri-
vacy, the laws were not arbitrary, as they promoted public health
and morality.46
Notably, the respondent in the case was Australia, not the state
of Tasmania. Although Tasmania disputed Toonen's claim, Aus-
tralia, at the federal level, did not, and filed submissions conceding
the privacy argument.47 However, in an unusual step, Tasmania's
arguments were also submitted to the Committee by the Australian
government in deference to basic requirements of fairness, which
require that both sides be permitted to put their case forward.4"
On the issue of equality, two arguments were made: one based
on sex and the other on sexual preference.49 Article 26 of the
ICCPR provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this re-
spect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
43 See Toonen, supra note 3, 1 1.
44 See ICCPR, supra note 2, at 177.
45 See Nicholas Toonen, Merits Response, Dec. 25, 1993, <http://www.queer.org.au/
qrd/documents/legal/taslaw/merits-response.html>.
46 See TGLRG, The U.N. Case, [hereinafter The U.N. Case] <http://
www.tased.edu.au/tasonline/tasqueer/uncase/uncase2.html>.
47 See Merits Response, supra note 45.
48 Notwithstanding this apparent emphasis on fairness, both the Tasmanian and
Australian governments initially refused to allow the TGLRG access to Tasmania's
arguments, until required to do so under Australian Freedom of Information laws, see
The U.N. Case, supra note 46.
49 See Toonen, supra note 3, 8.7.
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political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.5 0
The argument based on sex was straightforward: because Section
123 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code was confined in its operation
to men, it prima facie discriminated on the basis of sex,5 and this
was conceded by the Australian government.52 The argument
based on sexual preference was not as straightforward, because sex-
ual preference is not mentioned in Article 26 as a prohibited basis
of discrimination. Mr. Toonen and the TGLRG argued that sexual
preference was included in the term "other status" and thus was
covered by the ICCPR's protection of the right to equality.53 On
this issue, rather than conceding the argument, the Australian gov-
ernment sought the Committee's guidance.
The Human Rights Committee upheld Mr. Toonen's com-
plaint.55 The Committee took the view that the mere presence of
the criminal law, even in the absence of recent prosecutions under
it, amounted to a violation of the right to privacy. It stated:
The Committee considers that [S]ections 122(a) and (c) and
[Section] 123 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code "interfere" with
[Mr. Toonen's right to] privacy, even if these provisions have
not been enforced for a decade.5 6
The Committee rejected Tasmania's argument that the interfer-
ence with privacy was justified on public health grounds and the
protection of morals, noting that, in fact, "criminalization of homo-
sexual activity thus would appear to run counter to the implemen-
tation of effective education programmes in respect of the HIV/
AIDS prevention." 57 The Committee also noted that morality is
50 See 1CCPR, supra note 2, at 179. In addition to Article 26, Article 2(1) also
provides for non-discrimination in the application of the various rights set out in the
ICCPR:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
See ICCPR, supra note 2, at 173. Mr. Toonen relied on Article 2(1) in conjunction
with Article 17 as part of his case.
51 Of course, one remedy for this breach would simply be to extend the law's oper-
ation to women- certainly not the outcome the TGLRG was seeking.
52 See The U.N. Case, supra note 46.
53 See Merits Response, supra note 45.
54 See Merits Response, supra note 45, at 3(a) (ii).
55 See Toonen, supra note 3, 8.6.
56 See Toonen, supra note 3, 8.2.
57 See Toonen, supra note 3, 1 8.5.
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not a matter of exclusively domestic concern. 58
The Committee did not find it necessary to form a view on the
equality question, but in passing it commented that when the
ICCPR prohibits discrimination on the basis of 'sex' in Article 26
and Article 2(1), it includes 'sexual orientation.' 59 This indicates
that all rights protected by the ICCPR ought to be extended to
individuals regardless of their sexual preference.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF THE TOO VCA, CASE: TRANSLATION INTO
DOMESTIC LAW
The Human Rights Committee recommended that the appro-
priate remedy for Australia's breach of the ICCPR was the repeal of
the offending laws.6' However, Tasmania refused to act.6 ' Because
of the relationship between Australian law and international law in
the Australian legal system, the ICCPR, as interpreted by the Com-
mittee, had no direct effect in Australian law. Hence, Mr. Toonen
and the TGLRG still could not go to court to have Tasmania's laws
declared invalid.
The focus of reform thus shifted to the federal government.
After significant lobbying, the Commonwealth Parliament enacted
the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act of 1994 (Cth.).6 2 This
Act was couched in the narrowest possible terms, providing only
that sexual conduct between consenting adults in private was not
to be subject to any arbitrary interference with privacy within the
meaning of Article 17 of the ICCPR.6 3 There was no attempt to
give effect to the Committee's view that the ICCPR's equality right
extended to sexual preference.6 4
The Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act was a direct incor-
poration of part of the ICCPR's right to privacy into Australian law,
making it enforceable in domestic courts. It was enacted solely in
reliance on the external affairs power: as an implementation of
58 See Toonen, supra note 3, 8.6.
59 See Toonen, supra note 3, 8.7.
60 See Toonen, supra note 3.
61 See Rodney Croome, Sexual (mis)conduct, 20 ALTERNATIVE LAwJ. 282 (1995) (dis-
cussing effects of anti-gay Tasmanian laws); Wayne Morgan, Protecting Rights or Just
Passing the Buck? The Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) 1994, 1 AuSTL. J. OF Hum. RTs. Bill
409, 410 (1994); Bruce Montgomery, State Rejects Gay Law Change, THE AUSTRALIAN,
Sept. 28, 1994, at 4.
62 See Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994 (Austi.).
63 See Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act, § 4(1).
64 The Parliament could have enacted sexuality anti-discrimination laws at a fed-
eral level, but the government lacked the political will to undertake such a step.
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Australia's international treaty obligations. 5 Not only was it con-
troversial in nature due to its subject matter, but also because of
the States' rights arguments mentioned earlier, and because of the
role played by the Human Rights Committee. A number of com-
mentators suggested that it was entirely inappropriate for a Com-
mittee composed of foreigners,66 described as "unrepresentative,
unelected and motley" and coming from countries with poor
human rights records, to be pronouncing on Australia's human
rights record and, worse, to be dictating the content of our laws.6"
The intended effect of the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct)
Act was to override the provisions of the Tasmanian Criminal Code
through the inconsistency of the protection of privacy in the Fed-
eral Act with the criminalization of gay sex in the state Act. 68 How-
ever, due to political maneuvering, the legislation was not drafted
sufficiently clearly to achieve its intended aim, without further in-
terpretation by a court.6 9 Tasmania claimed that its criminal laws
did not arbitrarily interfere with privacy rights and therefore re-
mained valid, even in the face of the Committee's decision. 0 Thus
there was some degree of uncertainty as to the precise status of the
Tasmanian laws, notwithstanding the Human Rights Committee's
views and federal legislation. Mr. Toonen and another prominent
Tasmanian gay activist, Rodney Croome, then lodged a claim with
the High Court seeking a declaration that the Tasmanian legisla-
tion was invalid because it was inconsistent with the federal Human
Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act.71
The Croome case has now been terminated due to legislative
change in Tasmania. However, in 1996, the first stage of the case
concerning the Court's jurisdiction was heard.72 Tasmania initially
objected to the plaintiffs' standing on the basis that they had not
been prosecuted under the challenged laws.7 3 It later withdrew
65 See Croome, supra note 61, at 282.
66 Although there was in fact an Australian member of the Committee,Justice Eliz-
abeth Evatt.
67 Guy Barnett, U.N.: A Law to ltself on Tasmanian Gay Rights, THE AUSTRALIAN, Oct.
26, 1994, at 3; see Editorial, U.N. Rules from Afar, THE HERALD SUN, Apr. 13, 1994, at 9;
Rod Kemp, Shoot the Umpire, THE HERALD SUN, Apr. 13, 1994 at 10; Geoffrey Barker, A
Wrong Move for the Right Reasons, THE AGE, Apr. 21, 1994, at 6.
68 See Croome, supra note 61, at 282.
69 See Croome, supra note 61, at 282.
70 See Croome, supra note 61, at 283.
71 The author acted as legal adviser to the plaintiffs and the Tasmanian Gay and
Lesbian Rights Group in the High Court case.
72 See Croome v. Tasmania (1997) 142 A.L.R. 397.
73 See id. Before the case began and independently of it, the plaintiffs had made
confessions of sodomy to the police and a lesbian activist had confessed to aiding and
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that objection,7 4 but argued that the issue was hypothetical, for the
same reason, and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court
because federal courts do not have the power to give advisory opin-
ions.75 The plaintiffs made essentially the same arguments that
they had made to the Human Rights Committee: that prosecutions
were irrelevant as the Tasmanian Criminal Code impacted on their
daily lives regardless of prosecution under its provisions. 76 In par-
ticular, they argued that the Code was used to justify discrimination
both by individuals and by the government. 77 In those circum-
stances, it was argued, prosecution was unnecessary either to estab-
lish standing or to establish the court's jurisdiction; the interest the
plaintiffs had was sufficient and the matter was not hypothetical.78
Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted that Section 109 of the Consti-
tution, concerning the preemption of federal laws, operates to con-
fer upon individuals a right to know the law that governs their
behavior.79
The High Court handed down its decision on the preliminary
questions of standing and jurisdiction in February 1997.0 It de-
cided unanimously that the plaintiffs had a sufficient interest to
attract standing and that the case did not concern a hypothetical
question." Rather, it concerned a dispute about the rights and
duties of the plaintiffs and involved the administration of the law-
namely, the administration of the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct)
abetting such acts by knowingly lending her apartment to one of the plaintiffs for the
purpose of sexual activity. However, no charges were laid, although the Director of
Public Prosecutions concluded that there was a case to answer. The Tasmanian gov-
ernment relied upon this as demonstrating the absence of a threat of prosecution. See
id.
74 Tasmania gave no reasons for the withdrawal of this argument, which proved
fatal to their objections to the court's jurisdiction. One can only speculate as to
whether the Tasmanian government wanted to lose the case for political reasons, or
whether they were simply unable to see the consequences of their move.
75 Croome, 142 A.L.R. at 405; see also In re The Judiciary Act 1903-1920 and The
Navigation Act 1912-1920 (1921) 29 C.L.R. 257 (discussing the federal courts' inabil-
ity to give advisory opinions); North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corp. v. Queensland
(1996) 185 C.L.R. 595 (holding that to allow an advisory opinion would be to go
beyond the constitutional empowerment of the High Court in its appellate and origi-
nal jurisdiction).
76 Croome, 142 A.L.R. at 403.
77 id.
78 Id. at 411.
79 Id. at 410; see also University of Wollongong v. Metwally (1984) 158 C.L.R. 447,
457, 476-77 (discussing the argument that Section 109 centers rights on individuals to
know the law applicable to their conduct).
80 Croome, 142 A.L.R. at 404.
81 Id.
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Act, in conjunction with the Constitution.82 Three judges also ac-
cepted the plaintiffs' argument that Section 109 of the Constitu-
tion confers on individual Australians a right to ascertain which law
governs their conduct where a State law and a federal law con-
flict.83 This aspect of the case, if subsequently accepted by a major-
ity of the Court, will have significant implications for the ability of
individuals to enforce rights granted under federal legislation im-
plementing Australia's international obligations.
Under the present state of Australian constitutional law, it was
clear that Tasmania could not succeed on the merits of the case
having lost the standing and jurisdiction arguments. In April 1997,
the Tasmanian Parliament passed legislation repealing the offend-
ing sections of the Criminal Code, which removed the need for a
hearing on the merits.8 4
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR DOMESTIC LITIGATION STRATEGIES
The Toonen case study is illustrative of a number of points
about using international human rights law to assist in domestic
82 Id. at 399.
83 Id. at 410.
84 The merits phase would have addressed whether the Human Rights (Sexual
Conduct) Act overrode Sections 122 and 123 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code. This
would have involved arguments about the meaning of "arbitrary interference" in the
Commonwealth legislation; the use to which international law may be put in deter-
mining Parliament's intention; and most importantly, the use to which the views of
the Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights may be put
in determining the outcome of the case. It was expected that, following its earlier
jurisprudence on the subject, the Court would have interpreted the Act in accordance
with international standards. As Justice Brennan observed in Koowarta v. Bjelke-Pe-
tersen (1982) 153 C.L.R. 168, 265:
When Parliament chooses to implement a treaty by a statute which uses
the same words as the treaty, it is reasonable to assume that Parliament
intended to import into municipal law a provision having the same ef-
fect as the corresponding provision in the treaty. A statutory provision
corresponding with a provision in a treaty which the statute is enacted
to implement should be construed by municipal courts in accordance
with the meaning to be attributed to the treaty provision in interna-
tional law. Indeed, to attribute a different meaning to the statute from
the meaning which international law attributes to the treaty might be to
invalidate the statute in part or in whole, and such a construction of the
statute should be avoided. (citations omitted).
Thus it was likely that the Court would have adopted the interpretation of Article 17
of the ICCPR enunciated by the Human Rights Committee, drawing perhaps on Eu-
ropean jurisprudence for assistance. On such an approach, there was little doubt that
the mere existence of the Tasmanian Criminal Code amounted to an arbitrary inter-
ference with privacy within the meaning of the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act
and would have been found to be inconsistent with that Act and invlaid to the extent
of the inconsistency.
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battles. First, it illustrates the importance of international human
rights law in offering an avenue for individuals to seek redress for
human rights violations and to achieve change in Australian and
other legal systems where domestic law is discriminatory or oppres-
sive. Had it not been for the international avenue under the First
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, it is most unlikely that the federal
government would ever have legislated on the issue, and change
would not have occurred. Unfortunately, of course, victory at the
international level will not always translate into change in the do-
mestic legal system. Australia has also been found to be in breach
of the ICCPR in its treatment of refugees upon their arrival in Aus-
tralia,8 5 yet this decision has not resulted in any change to the op-
pressive legislative regime under which mistreatment is justified.
Indeed, the government has positively ruled out such change., 6
Furthermore, when domestic legal change occurs, it will not neces-
sarily result in real changes in people's lives; law may be a powerful
discourse, but it cannot alter prejudice and discrimination
overnight.
Second, the Toonen case illustrates that the process of using
international law can be very long and drawn out in terms of
achieving substantive change. Toonen's original communication
with the Committee was lodged in December 1991, but no decision
was reached by the Committee until April 1994. Additionally,
although federal legislation was passed in November 1994, the
High Court did not render judgment on the preliminary issues of
the case until February 1997. In May 1997, the Tasmanian Parlia-
ment finally relented and repealed the offending laws; nearly 6
years had passed since the communication was lodged, and almost
10 years had passed since the TGLRG began its campaign. In part
this is because, in the Australian context, international law is of
limited use where there is no political will to implement it, as it is
not directly applicable in Australian law. International legal norms
are given effect only after lengthy law reform processes and, in
many instances, lengthy court cases.
A third point to note is that those of us involved in the case
saw the courts as a last resort - partly because they were not avail-
able at many stages of the battle, but more so because legislative
reform was seen as the ultimate goal. Furthermore, even when the
85 A (name deleted) v. Australia, Comm. No. 560/1993, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm'n., 59th Sess., U.N.Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 30, 1997).
86 SeeJanine MacDonald, Australia Rejects Ruling on Asylum Seeker, THE AGE, Dec. 18,
1997, at A10.
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courts were involved, the effect the case had on public perceptions
and prejudices surrounding lesbian and gay sexuality was as impor-
tant as the legal outcome. Courts can provide a useful forum
through which to gain media coverage and thus gain opportunities
to raise awareness of the position of lesbians and gay men in
society.
Because of this broader focus, publicity was very important to
the TGLRG. Mr. Croome and Mr. Toonen wanted to hold press
conferences and distribute media bulletins at all stages of the case
in order to get as much political mileage from the process as possi-
ble. To a United States audience, this may sound quite straightfor-
ward, but this is not the usual way cases are run in Australia, and
the barristers representing the plaintiffs found it a little disturbing.
Fourth, the composition of the legal team for the domestic
litigation in the Toonen case is of some interest. In Australia, a
plaintiff usually employs a solicitor who prepares the case and a
barrister who argues the case in court. In Toonen, instead of solici-
tors preparing the case, this work was undertaken by two academic
lawyers-Wayne Morgan and myself.8 7 This was done in order to
keep as much of the process within the gay and lesbian community
as possible and, in the absence of an organization such as the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, this was the best way
to achieve that goal. As queer lawyers, Mr. Morgan and I could, in
a way, see both sides-the doctrinal arguments and the activist
strategies. We could also translate the legal arguments into plainer
language for the "clients," the TGLRG, so that at all times the
plaintiffs understood what was happening and what their options
were. Therefore, the plaintiffs could exercise a degree of control
over the proceedings rather than simply ceding control to the law-
yers. Additionally, we could translate the clients' concerns to the
lawyers.
One of these client concerns was that the court hear the vari-
ous experiences of discrimination that lesbians and gay men exper-
ienced in Tasmania. The rules of evidence did not permit
extensive information about individuals other than the plaintiffs,
but we did succeed in presenting the stories of Mr. Croome and
Mr. Toonen to the court in order to place them on the public rec-
ord. It was clear that they had a persuasive effect on at least some
members of the court, both during oral arguments and when the
judgment on standing was handed down.
87 For legal reasons, there were solicitors on the court record, however they were
not involved in preparing the arguments or briefing the barristers.
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In keeping with the TGLRG's mandate, we were also keen to
have lesbians involved in the case. Even though the legislation did
not criminalize lesbian sex, it was clear that lesbians in Tasmania
experienced prejudice, discrimination, and stigmatization as a re-
sult of the effects of the legislation. This was partly because in the
public mind the legislation criminalized all "homosexual" sex and
partly because of the tendency of homophobia to include both les-
bians and gay men. We contemplated a lesbian plaintiff on this
basis, but decided that it would simply be too difficult for a court to
perceive the harm done to lesbians by the criminalization of gay
male sex. However, there were lesbian activists involved through
the TGLRG, and I provided the lesbian content on the legal team.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the Toonen case, international human rights law was crucial
in achieving legal change in Australia. The process was slow, but
ultimately we succeeded. Whether human rights law will be of the
same use in other cases, or in other countries, is by no means guar-
anteed. In the area of sexuality there is no international conven-
tion that makes specific reference to sexual preference. Therefore,
we have to make creative arguments that may not always work. The
Human Rights Committee's views in Toonen make this task much
easier. However, even in a jurisdiction with a reasonable record on
sexuality issues, such as Europe, the European Court of Justice re-
cently declined to offer protection from discrimination to lesbians
and gay men,8 8 indicating that there is still a battle ahead.
In the U.S. context, I am less qualified to assess the prospects
for successful use of international human rights norms.8" How-
ever, a number of things indicate that any optimism should be cau-
tious. First, the U.S. has not signed the First Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR, which means that individuals in the U.S. cannot take
cases to the United Nations Human Rights Committee. ° Second,
although the ICCPR has been ratified by the U.S., it is not self-
88 See Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd. (Feb. 17, 1998) (stating that
a prohibition of sex discrimination does not apply to differential treatment on the
basis of the sex of a person's sexual partner; the latter was characterized as sexual
orientation discrimination, which is not prohibited by European Community Law).
89 Others have done so post-Toonen, however; see, e.g., James D. Wilets, Using Inter-
national Law to Vindicate the Civil Rights of Gays and Lesbians in United States Courts, 27
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 33 (1995); Brenda Sue Thornton, The New International
Jurisprudence on the Right to Privacy: A Head-On Collision with Bowers v. Hardwick, 58
ALB. L. REv. 725 (1995).
90 U.N. Information Service, Press Release: Human Rights Committee concludes
Fifty-Fifth Session at Geneva, 16 Oct. - 3 Nov., U.N. Doc. HRICT/448 (1995).
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executing and thus requires legislative action to give effect to it in
U.S. law. Third, the continued existence of Bowers v. Hardwick9
makes arguments for rights in the area of sexual preference diffi-
cult, though Romer v. EvanS1- indicates that such arguments are not
impossible. Finally, U.S. courts have not, with some exceptions,
been particularly willing to use international decisions.
We ought not to see international human rights law and inter-
national fora as simple solutions to human rights problems. How-
ever, these are not reasons to avoid these tools altogether. I do not
wish to downplay the potential of applying international human
rights law to struggles in the domestic arena. Rather, I simply in-
tend to sound a note of caution. The Toonen case itself provides a
story with a happy ending: proof that international human rights
law can be very useful in combating local human rights violations.
94 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
92 517 U.S. 620 (1996).

